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Identity-Based Key Agreement for
Blockchain-Powered Intelligent Edge
Jie Zhang and Futai Zhang
Abstract—In the new paradigm of blockchain-powered intel-
ligent edge, the key agreement is a significant problem which
has not been extensively studied so far. Existing key agreement
protocols in the traditional public-key setting are usually too
complicated and heavy for edge and end devices. Besides, most
protocols in use do not have effective measures to resist side-
channel attacks which are increasingly threatening cloud servers,
edge devices and end devices. Identity (ID)-based protocols can be
conveniently implemented in the blockchain-powered intelligent
edge. Several leakage-resilient ID-based protocols which can
resist side-channel attacks have been proposed. However, they
all involve time-consuming pairing computations. Besides, none
of them address side-channel attacks to the key generation center
(KGC).
This paper designs and realizes two novel ID-based key
agreement protocols for the blockchain-powered intelligent edge,
including an extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) secure ID-based
authenticated key agreement (AKA) protocol and a continuous
after-the-fact leakage-resilient eCK (CAFL-eCK) secure ID-based
AKA protocol. Both protocols do not involve any heavy pairing
computation. Besides, the second one can resist side-channel
attacks to the KGC and the communicating parties. A hybrid
implementation of the two protocols can achieve high efficiency
and strong security at the same time in blockchain-powered
intelligent edge environments. This is demonstrated via a use
case of a blockchain-powered smart home.
Index Terms—identity-based key agreement, side-channel at-
tacks, leakage resilience, blockchain, intelligent edge, intelligent
Internet of Things.
I. INTRODUCTION
RECENT research on Intelligent Internet of Things (IIoT)emphasizes the significance of the intelligent edge layer.
As the middle layer between the cloud layer and the end
layer, intelligent edge can undertake computing tasks for smart
end devices on behalf of the cloud center. Compared with
traditional IoT paradigm which uploads data from end devices
to the remote cloud center for processing, the new paradigm
has a number of advantages, such as reducing response time,
alleviating security and privacy issues during uploading, and
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so on. However, it also brings the problem for the cloud
center to trace data. Under this background, blockchain is
introduced into the intelligent edge layer to enable traceability.
The integration of blockchain and intelligent edge are studied
in some recent works [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6] which have
established the framework of blockchain-powered intelligent
edge.
Key agreement is a significant problem in the blockchain-
powered intelligent edge. It establishes secret keys that un-
derlie the security of communications crossing and within
layers. However, there are several challenges. First, the most
frequently used key agreement methods [7] are based on tradi-
tional public key cryptosystem which explicitly authenticates
a user’s public key by a certificate issued by a fully trusted
certificate authority (CA for short) [8]. Second, most key
agreement protocols in use can not resist side-channel attacks
which are increasingly threatening cloud servers, edge devices
and end devices [9], [10], [11], [12].
The identity-based (ID-based) cryptosystems [13] are na-
tively suitable for the blockchain-powered intelligent edge
environments. They do not require any digital certificate and
thereby are much more convenient than traditional public-
key cryptosystems. The public keys are derived from users’
identity information, and the private keys are computed by a
key generation center (KGC). This can be easily realized in
blockchain-powered intelligent edge environments by setting
the cloud server as KGC and using the identities of intelligent
edge and end devices to derive their public keys.
For application in the blockchain powered intelligent edge
environments, a key agreement protocol should be lightweight
and leakage resilient. Although some existing pairing-free
and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC)-based protocols are
lightweight for smart edge and end devices [14], [15], [16],
[17], most of them cannot resist the side-channel attacks. We
noticed that several key agreement protocols secure under side-
channel attacks [11], [12] were proposed in recent years. But
they are all pairing-based requiring heavy computations, and
none of them consider the side-channel attacks to KGC. So
far, the most suitable one which can overcome the aforemen-
tioned challenges in the blockchain powered intelligent edge
environments is still unavailable in the literature.
Therefore, this paper focuses on the design and implementa-
tion of ID-based key agreement protocols for the blockchain-
powered intelligent edge. Both security and performance in
the senaro of blockchain-powered intelligent edge are fully
taken into account. The main contributions are summarized
as follows. Firstly, two ID-based authenticated key agreement
(AKA) protocols are put forward. Protocol I is secure under
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the extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model. Protocol II
is the leakage-resilient version of Protocol I. It has very
strong provable security under the continuous after-the-fact
leakage-resilient eCK (CAFL-eCK) model. It can resist side-
channel attacks to both the KGC (i.e., cloud centers) and
users (i.e., edge devices and end devices). Secondly, prototypes
for the two proposed protocols are realized, and a set of
experiments are carried out to study their performance. The
experimental results show that both protocols are acceptable
for commonly used devices in blockchain-powered intelligent
edge environments. Finally, a hybrid implementation of the
two protocols are demonstrated via a use case of blockchain-
powered smart home. It shows that the two protocols can
achieve high efficiency and strong security at the same time
in blockchain-powered intelligent edge environments.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
reviews some representative ID-based AKA protocols. Section
III presents related mathematical and cryptographical back-
ground. Section IV presents the system model. Section V,
VI, VII propose two ID-based AKA protocols, prove their
security and study their performance respectively. Section VIII
demonstrates the application of the two protocols through a use
case. Finally, Section IX concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
This section reviews existing ID-based AKA and leakage-
resilient AKA. Section II-A chronologically reviews ID-based
AKA protocols from early-stage ones to some recent ones.
It shows that the proposed ID-based AKA protocols have
innovation and are valuable development to the research field.
Section II-B reviews leakage-resilient models for AKA from
weaker to stronger ones. It shows that the prototypes and use
case of the proposed protocols narrow the gap between theory
and practice in the research field.
A. ID-Based AKA
Since Sharmir proposed the concept of ID-based cryp-
tography in 1984 [13], a large number of ID-based AKA
protocols were presented. This section gives a review of
some representative two-party ID-based AKA protocols in the
literature.
1) Early-Stage ID-Based AKA: The early-stage ID-based
AKA protocols were proposed in 1980s. The first ID-based
AKA was published by Okamoto in 1986 [18]. Its KGC setup
and private key extract are based on the RSA problem, and key
agreement is based on the discrete logarithm problem. Another
famous protocol was proposed by Gunther in 1989 [19]. It uses
the ElGamal signature in private key extract. These early-stage
protocols are pioneers of ID-based AKA though they have
some drawbacks in terms of design and security [20].
2) ID-Based AKA from Bilinear Pairings: After Boneh
and Franklin presented the first practical ID-based encryption
scheme from Weil pairing in 2001 [21], a number of ID-
based AKA protocols from bilinear pairing were proposed.
In 2002, Smart published the first ID-based AKA protocol
based on Weil pairing [22]. In 2003, Chen and Kudla improved
Smart’s protocol in terms of efficiency and security [23]. In
2005, McCullagh and Barreto designed a new efficient ID-
based AKA which can be instantiated in either escrowed or
escrowless mode [24]. These pairing-based protocols have a
similar construction in KGC setup and private key extract. The
main difference lies in the computation of the shared secrets.
The problem of these protocols is involving time-consuming
pairing computations.
3) ID-Based AKA without Bilinear Pairings: Paring-free
ID-based AKA protocols remove the computations of bilinear
pairing and thus improve the efficiency. Some typical protocols
were proposed by Fiore and Gennaro in [25], Cao et al. in [14],
Xie and Wang in [26], Sun et al. in [15], Ni et al. in [27], Bala
et al. in [16], and Islam and Biswas in [28]. These protocols
have a very similar design in KGC setup and private key
extract, and all use Diffie-Hellman key exchange or its elliptic
curve version in key agreement. The main difference lies in
session key computation, which leads to different provable
security in different security models.
4) ID-Based AKA in Recent Years: In recent years, sev-
eral new ID-based AKA protocols were proposed to achieve
better applicability for different application scenarios of IoT.
Some lightweight protocols are designed to reduce computing
burdens on limited IoT devices. For example, Zhang et al.
designed an ID-based AKA protocol for disaster scenarios
in [17]. Their protocol is pairing-free, has a low comput-
ing requirement on capability-limited devices, and thereby is
friendly to limited IoT devices. Kumar and Saxena also pro-
posed a pairing-free ID-based AKA for resource-constrained
devices [29]. Some protocols with anonymity were proposed
for scenarios such as smart grid, mobile edge computing and
fog computing where privacy is required. For example, Lei
et al. proposed an ID-based AKA protocol with anonymity
in the heterogeneous wireless networks [8]. Mahmood et
al. proposed an ID-based AKA with both anonymity and
untraceability for smart grid advanced metering infrastructure
[30]. Patonico et al. proposed an ID-based and anonymous
AKA protocol for fog computing [31]. Hassan et al. proposed
an ID-based AKA protocol for multi-server environment with
anonymity [32]. Jia et al. designed an ID-based anonymous
AKA protocol for mobile edge computing environment [33].
Leakage attacks are not considered in these protocols.
5) Leakage-Resilient ID-Based AKA: The security of all
the aforementioned protocols is based on some mathematically
hard problems and the assumption that the long-term private
keys are secure from attacks. However, the emerging side-
channel attacks can leak information of the long-term secrets
in physical manners. Under this situation, leakage-resilient
cryptography is established as a young branch that studies
cryptographic primitives resisting side-channel attacks. In re-
cent year, several leakage-resilient ID-based AKA protocols
were proposed. Ruan et al. proposed a pairing-based ID-
based AKA protocol that is secure in bounded-leakage and
extended-Canetti–Krawczyk (eCK) security model [11]. Wu et
al. designed an ID-based AKA with leakage-resilience in the
continuous-leakage eCK model [12]. Although these works
can resist some types of side-channel attacks, they are not
suitable for the blockchain-powered intelligent edge for two
reasons. Firstly, all of these protocols involve heavy pairing
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computations. Secondly, they do not consider side-channel
attacks to the KGC.
6) Summary: Although ID-based AKA is not quite new
research in cryptography, it is still active in both academia
and industry. Many new protocols are designed in recent
years to achieve better applicability in innovative application
scenarios and to achieve higher security against emerging
attacks. However, the most suitable one for the blockchain-
powered intelligent edge is still unavailable.
This paper presents two pairing-free ID-based AKA proto-
cols that are more applicable than existing ones in blockchain-
powered intelligent edge environments. Table I compares the
proposed protocols with some existing ID-based AKA proto-
cols in terms of efficiency (involving pairing or not), leakage-
resiliency, and provable security. It shows that the proposed
Protocol I has the strongest provable security among all non-
leakage-resilient protocols, and Protocol II has the strongest
provable security among all leakage-resilient protocols1.
B. Leakage-Resilient AKA
Leakage-resilient model for AKA and representative works
are introduced as follows.
1) Bounded Leakage: The bounded leakage model assumes
the amount of leakage is limited to an upper bound in the entire
execution period. D. Moriyama and T. Okamoto [43] proposed
a PKI-based AKA protocol which is λ-leakage resilient eCK
(BL-eCK) secure, where λ is the upper bound for the leakage
of long-term private keys.
2) Continuous Leakage: The continuous leakage model
assumes the leakage is limited to an upper bound in each
execution, but there is no bound on the overall leakage. It
is stronger than the bounded leakage. J. D. Wu et al. [12]
proposed an ID-based AKA protocol which is continuous
leakage-resilient eCK (CL-eCK) secure.
3) After-the-fact Leakage: After-the-fact leakage refers to
leakage which happens after the challenge is given to the
adversary. There are bounded after-the-fact leakage (BAFL)
and continuous after-the-fact leakage (CAFL) models which
are more stronger than the bounded and continuous leakage
models. J. Alawatugoda et al. studied AKA in both BAFL
and CAFL models and proposed BAFL-eCK secure [38] and
CAFL-eCK secure [37] AKA protocols.
4) Summary: The strongest leakage-resilient model for
AKA is CAFL-eCK model. Although there are some CAFL-
eCK secure AKA protocols, a CAFL-eCK secure ID-based
AKA protocol which is the most suitable for our scenario
is still unavailable in the literature. Besides, most work on
leakage-resilient AKA focus on the design and security proof
of protocols, but prototypes or application guidelines are still
unavailable. Therefore, our work which involves the design,
security proof, prototype and use case is a meaningful devel-
opment to the feild of leakage-resilient AKA and can narrow
the gap between theory and practice.
1eCK is the strongest security model for non-leakage-resilient AKA pro-
tocols. CAFL-eCK is the strongest security model for leakage-resilient AKA
protocols.
III. PRELIMINARIES
This section presents related mathematical and cryptograph-
ical backgrounds for our new protocols. Symbols used in this
paper are explained in Table II.
A. Elliptic Curve Group and Hard Problems
Let Fp be a finite field of integers modulo a prime number
p, and E be an elliptic curve defined by the following equation
y2 = x3 + ax+ b
where a, b ∈ Fp and 4a3 + 27b2 6= 0 mod p.
An elliptic curve group G consists of all points on E to-
gether with the point at infinity. The following two operations
are defined in G:
• Point addition of two points P1 and P2 is denoted by
P1 + P2 which returns a third point in G.
• Scalar multiplication between an integer t and a point P
is denoted by [t]P which returns a third point in G. It
can be computed as
[t]P = P + P + · · ·+ P︸ ︷︷ ︸
t
For vectors v = (v1, · · · vm) and w = (w1, · · · , wm), we
define
[v]P = ([v1]P, · · · , [vm]P )
and
[v]([w]P ) = [v ·w]P = [v1w1 + · · ·+ vmwm]P.
Here v ·w = v1w1 + · · ·+ vmwm denotes the inner product
of vectors v and w.
The following problems are assumed to be hard over G of
order n with a generator P [34].
1) Elliptic Curve Computational Diffie–Hellman (EC-
CDH) Problem: For some random a, b ∈ Zn, given
(P,G, [a]P, [b]P ), output [ab]P .
2) Elliptic Curve Decisional Diffie–Hellman (ECDDH)
Problem: For some random a, b, c ∈ Zn, given
(P,G, [a]P, [b]P, [c]P ), output 1 if [c]P = [ab]P and 0
otherwise.
3) Elliptic Curve Gap Diffie–Hellman (ECGDH) Problem:
For some random a, b ∈ Zn, given (P,G, [a]P, [b]P ) and an
oracle that solves the ECDDH problem on G, output [ab]P .
B. ID-Based AKA
An ID-based AKA is composed of three phases executed
by KGC and users.
• Phase 1: KGC setup. KGC initializes the system param-
eters and the master public and private keys. The master
public key and system parameters are published to all
users. The master private key is securely kept by KGC.
• Phase 2: Extract. Firstly, a user submits the private key
extract request with identity ID to KGC. Then, KGC
generates the private key using ID, the master private
key, and a random value. Finally, KGC returns the private
key to the user through some secure channels. The
corresponding public key can be derived from ID.
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TABLE I: Comparison
Protocol Involving pairing Leakage-resiliency on users Leakage-resiliency on KGC Provable security
[18] × × × ×
[19] × × × ×
[22] X × × ×
[23] X × × BR[39]
[24] X × × BR
[14] × × × mBR[40]
[15] × × × eCK
[16] × × × Modified eCK[42]
[25] × × × CK[41]
[26] × × × CK
[27] × × × eCK
[28] × × × ×
[17] × × × mBR
[29] × × × ×
[8] × × × eCK
[30] × × × CK
[31] × × × CK
[32] X × × Random oracle
[33] X × × Random oracle
[11] X X × BAFL-eCK
[12] X X × CL-eCK
Protocol I × × × eCK
Protocol II × X X CAFL-eCK
TABLE II: Symbols
Symbol Meaning
Fp The finite field with the prime order p.
E The elliptic curve.
G The elliptic curve group of E.
[t]P The scalar multiplication between an integer t and a point P on E.
[v]P The scalar multiplication between a vector t = (t1, · · · , tm) and a point P on E. The output is the vector ([t1]P, · · · , [tm]P )
P A generator of G.
Zn The set {0, · · · , n− 1} with respect to addition modulo n where n is the order of G and its generator P .
‖ The concatenation of bit strings.
x The master private key of KGC.
Ppub The master public key of KGC.
H1 A cryptographic secure hash function {0, 1}∗ ×G→ Zn.
H2 A cryptographic secure hash function {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ ×G×G×G×G→ {0, 1}k .
• Phase 3: AKA. Two users generate ephemeral private and
public keys, exchange ephemeral public keys via public
channels, and compute a shared session key based on
their long-term and ephemeral private and public keys.
The long-term private keys are generated in Phase 2.
C. Leakage-Resilient Method from Inner-Product
This method consists of an encoding protocol [35] which
randomly encodes a secret s ∈ Zn into two states sL, sR ∈
Z∗n
m\{(0m)} such that the inner product sL · sR = s, and a
refreshing protocol which securely refreshes the two states in
the presence of leakage.
1) Leakage-Resilient Encoding: EncodemZ∗n(s) randomly
selects sL ∈ Z∗n
m\{(0m)}, samples sR ∈ Z∗n
m\{(0m)}, and
outputs (sL, sR)
The leakage-resilience of the encoding protocol is stated in
Theorem 1.
Theorem 1: Let m > 1 and |Zn| = Ω(m). For any 1/2 >
δ > 0, γ > 0, EncodemZ∗n(s) is (λ, ε)-secure where λ = (1/2−
δ)m log |Zn| − log γ−1 and ε = 2(|Zn|2/3−mδ) + |Zn|γ.
2) Leakage-Resilient Refreshing: RefreshmZ∗n(sL, sR) re-
freshes (sL, sR) into (sL′, sR′) as follows:
1. Refresh sR:
– Sample two vectors aR, bR ∈ Z∗n
m\{(0m)} such
that aR · bR = 0
– Generate a random non-singular matrix M ∈
Z∗n
m×m such that sL ·M = aR
– Set cR := M · bR and sR′ := sR + cR
2. Refresh sL:
– Sample two vectors aL, bL ∈ Z∗n
m\{(0m)} such
that aL · bL = 0
– Generate a random non-singular matrix N ∈
Z∗n
m×m such that N · sR′ = bL
– Set cL := aL ·N and sL′ = sL + cL
3. Output (sL′, sR′)
The leakage-resilience of the refreshing protocol is stated
in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2: Let |Zn| = Ω(m) and o(m) = 1.
RefreshmZ∗n(sL, sR) is a (l, 0.15 ·m log |Zn| − 1, negl(m))-
refreshing protocol for EncodemZ∗n(s), where l denotes the
number of interactions between an adversary A and the
refreshing experiment [35] and negl(m) is some negligible
function.
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D. eCK Model
The eCK model [36] is a very strong security model for
AKA protocols. It is defined by an eCK security experiment
where an adversary M is given many corruption powers for
various key agreement sessions and must solve a challenge on
a test session. In the eCK security experiment, M controls
a certain number of parties and plays with a challenger C
through four phases as follows:
1. M makes any sequence of the following queries:
– Send(A,B,msg).M sends a message msg to party
A on behalf of party B and is given the response
according to the protocol specification.
– LongtermKeyReveal(A). M is given the long-
term key of A.
– EphemeralKeyReveal(A,B, sid). M is given the
ephemeral key of A and B in session sid.
– Reveal(sid). M is given a session key of a com-
pleted session sid.
2. M selects a completed session sid and makes the fol-
lowing query:
– Test(sid). M is given a challenge C which equals
to Reveal(sid) if b = 1 and is a random string if
b = 0 for some randomly picked b ∈ {0, 1}.
3. M makes queries as in Phase 1.
4. M makes the following query and the experiment termi-
nates:
– Guess(b′). M submits the value of b′.
The selected test session sid is clean if all of the following
conditions hold:
• M did not make Reveal(sid) or Reveal(sid∗) (if sid∗
exists) where sid∗ denotes the matching session to sid.















M wins the eCK security experiment if b′ = b and the test
session is clean.
Definition 1 (eCK security): An AKA protocol P is eCK-
secure if no efficient adversary M wins the eCK security
experiment with a nonnegligible advantage defined as




The eCK model covers most passive and active attacks but
not the side-channel attacks. It allows the attacker to reveal
either long-term or ephemeral keys of a party, but not both.
However, a side-channel attacker can leak both long-term and
ephemeral keys of a party at the same time.
E. CAFL-eCK Model
The CAFL-eCK model [37] is extended from eCK model
which captures side-channel attacks. It is defined by the
following CAFL-eCK experiment where the adversary M is
given all the power in eCK experiment as well as the power
of side-channel attack:
1. M makes any sequence of the following queries:
– Send(A,B,msg, f). M sends a message msg to
party A on behalf of party B and is given the re-
sponse according to the protocol specification, along
with the leakage f(skA) where skA is the long-term
secret key of A and f is a leakage function.
– Corrupt(A). This query is the same as the
LongtermKeyReveal(A) query in eCK secure ex-
periment. M is given the long-term key of A.
– EphemeralKeyReveal(A,B, sid). This query is
the same as the EphemeralKeyReveal(A,B, sid)
query in eCK secure experiment. M is given the
ephemeral key of A and B in session sid.
– Reveal(sid). This query is the same as the
Reveal(sid) query in eCK secure experiment. M
is given a session key of a completed session sid.
2. M selects a completed session sid and makes the fol-
lowing query:
– Test(sid). This query is the same as the Test(sid)
query in eCK secure experiment. M is given a
challenge C which equals to Reveal(sid) if b = 1
and is a random string if b = 0 for some randomly
picked b ∈ {0, 1}.
3. M makes queries as in Phase 1.
4. M makes the following query and the experiment termi-
nates:
– Guess(b′). M submits the value of b′.
The selected test session is λ-CAFL-eCK-fresh if all the
following conditions hold:
• M did not make Reveal(sid) or Reveal(sid∗) (if sid∗
exists)
• sid∗ exists andM did not make any set of the following
queries:
– Corrupt(A) and EphemeralKeyReveal(A,B, sid)
– Corrupt(B) and EphemeralKeyReveal(B,A, sid∗)
• sid∗ does not exist and M did not make any set of the
following queries:
– Corrupt(A) and EphemeralKeyReveal(A,B, sid)
– Corrupt(B)
• For each Send(A,B,msg, f) query, |f(skA)| ≤ λ
M wins the CAFL-eCK security experiment if b′ = b and
the test session is λ-CAFL-eCK-fresh.
Definition 2 (λ-CAFL-eCK security): An AKA protocol P
is λ-CAFL-eCK-secure if no efficient adversary M wins the
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CAFL-eCK security experiment with a nonnegligible advan-
tage defined as




Let P be an AKA protocol constructed from an AKA proto-
col P ′ using a leakage-resilient encoding protocol EncodemZ∗n
and a leakage-resilient refreshing protocol RefreshmZ∗n . The
following theorem shows the relation between the CAFL-eCK
security of P and the eCK security of P ′ [37]. It will be used
in the security proof of the proposed Protocol II.
Theorem 3: Protocol P is λ-CAFL-eCK-secure if the
underlying protocol P ′ is eCK-secure, and RefreshmZ∗n is
a (l, λ, ε)-refreshing protocol for EncodemZ∗n . The advantage
Advλ−CAFL−eCKP (M) of a PPT adversary M against P in
the λ-CAFL-eCK security game is ≤ np(AdveCKP ′ (M) + ε),




The blockchain-powered intelligent edge framework is
shown in Fig 1. It has three layers:
• The end layer consists of IoT end devices which collect
data from the environment (e.g., temperature sensors) or
execute instructions (e.g., intelligent lamps).
• The edge layer consists of edge devices which mainly
transmit data between the end layer and the cloud layer.
It also processes some data on behalf of the cloud layer
and maintains blockchain ledger to keep track of data
processing.
• The cloud layer is composed of cloud servers which
are used to store and process large volumes of data. It
can trace data processed in the edge layer through the
blockchain ledger.
There are three types of entities in the blockchain-powered
intelligent system. The network model among them is ab-
stracted in Fig 2.
• The channels between KGC (cloud centers) and users
(edge/end devices) are secure channels during user regis-
tration and key extraction processes. The secure channel
is only used once in the initialization process (i.e., key
extraction). It is not used in the AKA processes. It can
be realized via out-of-band manners (e.g., QR code) or
a secure handshake. We will illustrate one method in the
use case in Section VIII.
• The channels between users are public channels during
AKA process. These channels are subject to attacks
explained below in Section IV-B.
Fig. 2: Network framework
B. Threat Model
The attackers against the system are assumed to have the
following powers:
• Controlling the message flow over public channels. This
coresponses to Send query in eCK and CAFL-eCK
models;
• Revealing ephemeral keys. This corresponses to
EphemeralKeyReveal query in eCK and CAFL-eCK
models;
• Revealing long-term keys. This coresponses to Corrupt
query in eCK and CAFL-eCK models;
• Side-channel attacks. This coresponses to Send query in
CAFL-eCK model.
The restriction is that the attackers are not allowed to reveal
both ephemeral and long-term secrets of the same party, since
in this case, they will trivially break any AKA protocol.
C. Design Objectives
Under the above threat model, the proposed key agreement
protocols are expected to achieve the following objectives:
• eCK security which guarantees mutual authentication and
agreement of secure session keys between two parties
against attackers with above powers excluding side-
channel attacks.
• CAFL-eCK security which guarantees mutual authenti-
cation and agreement of secure session keys between
two parties against attackers with above powers including
side-channel attacks.
• Affordable computing burden for IoT devices.
V. LEAKAGE-RESILIENT ID-BASED KEY AGREEMENT
This section presents two ID-based key agreement proto-
cols. It first gives an overview of these protocols, and then
formally describes the two protocols: eCK secure Protocol I
and CAFL-eCK secure Protocol II.
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Fig. 1: System overview of the Blockchain-powered intelligent edge
A. Overview
1) Setup: KGC takes a security parameter k ∈ Z+ as input
and initializes system parameters and a master key:
1. Generate {p, Fp, G, P,H1, H2} where p is a k-bit prime,
Fp is a finite field of order p, G is an elliptic curve group
over Fp, n is the order of G, P is a generator of G,
H1 : {0, 1}∗ × G → Zn and H2 : {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ ×
G×G×G×G→ {0, 1}k are two cryptographic secure
hash functions.
2. Select a random value x from Zn as the master private
key and compute the master public key Ppub = [x]P .
3. Output {p, Fp, G, P,H1, H2, Ppub} as system parameters
and secretly keep the master private key x.
2) Extract: KGC takes a user’s identity ID as input and
returns private key for the user:
1. Select a random r from Zn and compute RID = [r]P .
2. Compute h = H1(ID||RID).
3. Compute sID = r + h · x mod n.
4. Securely send the private key (RID, sID) to the user.
The user can verify the correctness of the private key
through the following equation:
[sID]P
?
= RID + [H1(ID||RID)]Ppub
3) AKA: Two communicating parties agree a fresh shared
session key through the following phases:
1. Key exchange: Generate ephemeral secrets and public
values, and exchange public values over open channels.
2. Shared secrets computation: Compute shared secrets us-
ing their own long-term and ephemeral secrets and the
other party’s public values.
3. Session key derivation: Derive the session key from the
shared secrets using some key deriving function.
B. Protocol I: IDAKA
1) Setup: KGC initializes the system parameters
{p, Fp, G, P,H1, H2, Ppub} and the master private key
x through the processes in Section V-A1.
2) Extract: Let A and B denote two communicating parties
and their identities respectively. A and B extract their long-
term private keys (RA, sA) and (RB , sB) from KGC through
the processes in Section V-A2.
3) AKA: A and B agree the shared session key as follows:
1. Key exchange:
– A selects a random a from Zn, computes TA = [a]P ,
and sends (A,RA, TA) to B.
– B selects a random b from Zn, computes TB = [b]P ,
and sends (B,RB , TB) to A.
2. Shared secrets computation:
– A computes the shared secrets as follows:
ZA1 = [sA](RB + [H1(B||RB)]Ppub)
ZA2 = [a](RB + [H1(B||RB)]Ppub)
ZA3 = [sA]TB
ZA4 = [a]TB
– B computes the shared secrets as follows:
ZB1 = [sB ](RA + [H1(A||RA)]Ppub)
ZB2 = [sB ]TA
ZB3 = [b](RA + [H1(A||RA)]Ppub
ZB4 = [b]TA
3. Session key derivation
– A computes KA = H2(A,B,ZA1, ZA2, ZA3, ZA4)
– B computes KB = H2(A,B,ZB1, ZB2, ZB3, ZB4)
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C. Protocol II: LR-IDAKA
1) Setup: KGC takes a security parameter k ∈ Z+ as input
and initializes system parameters and two states of the master
private key.
1. This step is identical with step 1 in Section V-A1. It
generates parameters {p, Fp, G, P,H1, H2}.
2. Select two random vectors xL,xR ∈ Z∗n
m\{(0m)}(m ≥
2) as the master private key states and compute the master
public key as follows:
Ppub = [xL · xR]P
3. Output {p, Fp, G, P,H1, H2, Ppub} as system parameters
and secretly keep xL and xR in two separate memories.
2) Extract: KGC takes a user’s identity ID as input and
returns the private key for the user:
1. Select a random rID from Zn and compute RID =
[rID]P .
2. Compute h = H1(ID||RID).
3. Compute s1ID = h · xL and sID = rID + s1ID · xR.
4. Invoke RefreshmZ∗n(xL,xR) to update the memories for
xL and xR.
5. Securely send the private key (RID, sID) to the user.
Specifically, A and B receive (RA, sA) and (RB , sB)
respectively. Then they store their private keys through the
leakage-resilient encoding protocol:
• A invokes EncodemZ∗n(sA) to output sAL and sAR,
destroys sA, and securely stores sAL and sAR in two
separate memories.
• B invokes EncodemZ∗n(sB) to output sBL and sBR,
destroys sB , and securely stores sBL and sBR in two
separate memories.
3) AKA: A and B agree a shared session key through the
following steps.
1. Key exchange:
– A selects a random a from Zn, computes TA = [a]P ,
and sends (A,RA, TA) to B.
– B selects a random b from Zn, computes TB = [b]P ,
and sends (B,RB , TB) to A.
2. Shared secrets computation:
– A computes the shared secrets as follows:










and then invokes RefreshmZ∗n(sAL, sAR) to update
the memories for sAL and sAR.
– B computes the shared secrets as follows:








ZB3 = [b](RA + [H1(A||RA)]Ppub
ZB4 = [b]TA
and then invokes RefreshmZ∗n(sBL, sBR) to update
the memories for sBL and sBR.
3. Session key derivation
– A computes KA = H2(A,B,ZA1, ZA2, ZA3, ZA4)
– B computes KB = H2(A,B,ZB1, ZB2, ZB3, ZB4)
D. Correctness
1) Correctness of Protocol I: By the end of Protocol I, the
session keys computed by A and B are identical since
ZA1 = [sA](RB + [H1(B||RB)]Ppub)
= [sA · sB ]P = [sB · sA]P
= [sB ](RA + [H1(A||RA)]Ppub)
= ZB1
ZA2 = [a](RB + [H1(B||RB)]Ppub)
= [a · sB ]P = [sB · a]P = [sB ]TA
= ZB2
ZA3 = [sA]TB
= [sA · b]P = [b · sA]P
= [b](RA + [H1(A||RA)]Ppub)
= ZB3
ZA4 = [a]TB
= [a · b]P = [b · a]P = [b]TA
= ZB4
Hence we have
KA = H2(A,B,ZA1, ZA2, ZA3, ZA4)
= H2(A,B,ZB1, ZB2, ZB3, ZB4)
= KB
2) Correctness of Protocol II: By the end of Protocol I, the




= [sAR]([sAL](RB + [H1(B||RB)]Ppub))
= [sAR · sAL](RB + [H1(B||RB)]Ppub)
= [sA](RB + [H1(B||RB)]Ppub)
= [sA][sB ]P = [sB ][sA]P
= [sB ](RA + [H1(A||RA)]Ppub)
= [sBR · sBL](RA + [H1(A||RA)]Ppub)
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ZA2 = [a](RB + [H1(B||RB)]Ppub)
= [a · sB ]P = [sB · a]P = [sB ]TA








= [sAR]([sAL]TB) = [sAR · sAL]TB
= [sA]TB = [sA · b]P = [b · sA]P
= [b](RA + [H1(A||RA)]Ppub)
= ZB3
ZA4 = [a]TB
= [a · b]P = [b · a]P = [b]TA
= ZB4
Therefore, the session key
KA = H2(A,B,ZA1, ZA2, ZA3, ZA4)
= H2(A,B,ZB1, ZB2, ZB3, ZB4)
= KB
VI. SECURITY PROOF
This section proves the eCK security of Protocol I and
CAFL-eCK security of Protocol II.
A. eCK security of Protocol I
The eCK security of Protocol I is declared in Theorem 4
which is proved via the eCK security experiment introduced
in Section III-D.
Theorem 4: Protocol I is eCK secure if H2 is modeled as
a random oracle and the ECGDH problem is hard in G.
For any adversary M against Protocol I that involves at
most np honest parties and activates at most ns sessions, the
advantage of M is:
AdveCKI (M) ≤ max(
n2s
2
, npns) ·AdvECGDHG (S)
where S denotes a ECGDH solver which is constructed using
A and against the ECGDH problem in G.
We give the proof sketch to Theorem 4 as follows. The
complete security proof is provided in the appendix.
Proof Sketch: To prove Protocol I is eCK secure, we
need to prove that no efficient adversary M wins the eCK
security experiment with a nonnegligible advantage, that is,
AdveCKI (M) = Pr[M wins]−
1
2
is negligible for any adversary M against Protocol I.
We construct a ECGDH solver S against the ECGDH
problem in G using M as a subroutine. The construction is
introduced as follows. S takes an ECGDH challenge V =
[v]P,W = [w]P for some unknown v, p ∈ Zn, plays the eCK
experiment as a challenger withM, and replaces some values
returned by honest parties in a way such that 1) M cannot
detect any modification made by S, and 2) when M wins the
experiment, S can output the result to ECGDH(V,W ). We
can prove that






Given that the ECGDH problem is hard in G,
AdvECGDHG (S) is negligible. Therefore, AdveCKI (M)
is negligible.
B. λ-CAFL-eCK security of Protocol II
The CAFL-eCK security of Protocol II is declared in
Theorem 5 which is proved via the eCK security of Protocol
I and Theorem 3.
Theorem 5: Protocol II is λ-CAFL-eCK secure if H2 is
modeled as a random oracle and the ECGDH problem is hard
in G. For any adversary M against Protocol II, that involves
at most np honest parties and activates at most ns sessions,
the advantage of M is:
Advλ−CAFL−eCKII (M) ≤ np · (Adv
eCK
I (M) + ε).
where ε is negligible.




. First, Protocol I is eCK secure,
which has been proved in Theorem 4. Second, Theorem 1 and
2 show that RefreshmZ∗n is a (l, λ, ε)-refreshing protocol for
EncodemZ∗n where λ = 0.15 · m log n. Finally, according to
Theorem 3,
Advλ−CAFL−eCKII (M) ≤ np · (Adv
eCK
I (M) + ε)
is negligible since AdveCKI (M) and ε are negligible. There-
fore, Protocol II is CAFL-eCK secure according to Definition
2.
VII. PERFORMANCE
This section presents theoretical evaluation and experimen-
tal tests of the performance of the proposed protocols.
A. Evaluation
The performance is evaluated from two aspects: computing
cost and secure storage cost. The computing cost is evaluated
via the number of time-consuming operations, i.e., scalar
multiplications. The secure storage cost is evaluated via the
size of secret keys. The results are listed in Table III and IV
where m ≥ 2 for security purpose and l denotes the length of
a private key.
From Table III we can find that:
• The computing costs on KGC in Protocol II will be
higher than in Protocol I. Although Protocol I and II
require equal numbers of scalar multiplications, Protocol
II requires additional execution of the Refresh protocol
in the extract process.
• The computing costs on users A and B in Protocol II are
higher than in Protocol I. Specifically, Protocol II requires
4m−2 scalar multiplications more than Protocol I on both
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TABLE III: Evaluation of computing cost
Protocol Stage Scalar mulitplication on KGC Scalar mulitplication on A Scalar mulitplication on B
Protocol I
Setup 1 0 0
Extract 1 0 0
AKA 0 6 6
Protocol II
Setup 1 0 0
Extract 1 0 0
AKA 0 4m+ 4 (m ≥ 2) 4m+ 4 (m ≥ 2)
TABLE IV: Evaluation of secure storage cost
Protocol Secret key size on KGC Secret key size on A Secret key size on B
Protocol I l l l
Protocol II 2ml (m ≥ 2) 2ml (m ≥ 2) 2ml (m ≥ 2)
A and B. Given that m ≥ 2, the increased computing cost
is at least 6 scalar multiplications on each user.
From Table IV, we can see that the secure storage costs
on KGC and the two users in Protocol II are higher than in
Protocol I. The increased cost is (2m− 1)l, i.e., at least 3l on
both KGC and the two parties.
Overall, Protocol II has lower performance than Protocol
I. This is reasonable as Protocol II has stronger security and
can resist side-channel attacks. The next subsection will study
whether the costs of the proposed protocols are acceptable
for some widely used devices in the blockchain-powered
intelligent edge environments.
B. Experiments
Prototypes of the proposed protocols are realized with
the parameters specified in Table VI. They are run on the
experimental platform introduced in Table V.
TABLE VI: Prototype parameters
Parameters Specification
Elliptic curve P-192 and P-256 in NIST.FIPS.186-3
H1, H2, H3 SHA-256 in NIST. FIPS.180-2
l 192 bits, 256 bits
m 2
Enc,Dec Rabbit stream cipher in RFC 4503
In the experiments, the computing cost is tested via average
computing time on each device. Each protocol is run 10 times
to test the computing time. The average computing time is
compared in Fig. 3.
From the comparison we can see that:
• For each of the three devices, the computing time in
Protocol II is higher than in Protocol I.
• The computing time of Protocol II with P-192 and
P-256 is acceptable for commonly used devices. The
longest computing time is 1.56 seconds with P-256 on
a Raspberry Pi.
The secure storage cost is tested via the files size of private
keys on each device. The file size is compared in Fig. 4.
From the comparison we conclude that:
• For each of the three devices, the increased secure storage
in Protocol II is about 3 times that of in Protocol I.
• The requirement for secure storage of Protocol II with
P-192 and P-256 are acceptable for widely used devices.
The largest secure storage for A or B is 467 bytes with
P-256. This is acceptable for Raspberry Pi.
In summary, although Protocol II has higher computing and
secure storage costs than Protocol I, the costs are acceptable
for widely used devices in the blockchain-powered intelligent
edge.
C. Comparison
Table I in Section II-A6 has shown comparisons of the
proposed protocols with some existing ID-based AKA pro-
tocols in terms of efficiency, leakage-resiliency, and provable
security. It shows that Protocol I has the strongest provable
security among all non-leakage-resilient protocols, and Proto-
col II has the strongest provable security among all leakage-
resilient ones.
Here we use Table VII to compare the peformance of the
proposed protocols with some representive ID-based AKA
protocols (pairing-free and/or leakage-resilient ones) which
can be used in the same scenario. In the table, E denotes
group exponentiation (or scalar multiplication in elliptic curve
group), and P denotes bilinear pairing. The computing cost
on a user is evaluated by the number of time-consuming
operations during key agreement process.
TABLE VII: Comparison for performance
Protocol Computing cost on a user Security
Protocol I 6E eCK
Protocol II (4m+ 4)E (m ≥ 2) CAFL-eCK
[14] 4E mBR
[15] 6E eCK






[11] 8E + 2P BAFL-eCK
[12] 4E + 3P CL-eCK
According to Table VII, among all non-leakage-resilient and
pairing-free protocols, the computing cost of Protocol I is
equal to or lower than that of the other protocols ([15], [27])
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TABLE V: Experimental platform
Participant Device CPU Memory Storage
Cloud server (KGC) Desktop 3.2 GHz Intel Core i5 8 GB 921 GB
Edge device (A or B) Laptop 2.3 GHz Intel Core i5 8 GB 256 GB
End device (A or B) Raspberry Pi 1.5 GHz Cortex A-72 2 GB 16 GB
Fig. 3: Experiment result: average computing time on each device
Fig. 4: Experiment result: secure storage on each device
with same level of security (eCK). Protocol II is the only
pairing-free protocol with leakage-resiliency; and its security
is the strongest among all leakage-resilient protocols.
VIII. USE CASE
This section demonstrates the application of the proposed
ID-based key agreement protocols in the blockchain-powered
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smart home scenario.
A. System Overview
The blockchain-powered smart home is shown in Fig. 5. It
has three layers:
• The end layer is composed of smart end devices such as
smart lamps, robot vacuums, cameras, etc. These devices
have limited computing and networking capabilities.
• The edge layer is composed of intelligent edge devices
such as laptops, tablets, smart phones, etc. These devices
collect and process data from the end layer and commu-
nicate with the cloud layer. Besides, a blockchain ledger
is maintained to keep track of data processing. The edge
devices are much powerful than end devices in terms of
computing and networking capabilities.
• The cloud layer is composed of powerful cloud servers
which are used to store and process large volumes of data.
It can trace data processed in the edge layer through the
blockchain ledger.
B. Implementation of ID-based Key Agreement
This scenario assumes that the cloud center and edge
devices are threaten by side-channel attacks, and the end
devices in the smart home are safe from side-channel attacks.
To achieve high efficiency and strong security, the ID-based
key agreement mechanism uses a hybrid implementation of
Protocol I and II.
1) Implementation of Setup: The leakage-resilient KGC of
Protocol II is deployed on the cloud server. It extracts private
keys for all edge and end devices in the smart home. The two
vectors xL and xR of master private key are stored securely
and separately.
2) Implementation of Extract: The Extract process is il-
lustrated in Fig. 6. A device (e.g. a smart lamp) registers to
the cloud center and extracts its private key via the following
steps:
• The smart lamp generates a random a ← Zn, computes
A = [a]P and sends A and its identity lamp001 to the
cloud center (KGC).
• The cloud center generates a random c ← Zn, and
computes C = [c]P and kAC = H3([c]A) where H3 is a
cryptography hash function. Then it generates the private
key (Rlamp001, slamp001) for the smart lamp, encrypts the
private key using kAC and sends the cyphertext Elamp001,
C and its identity IDKGC to the smart lamp.
• The smart lamp first computes kAC = H3([a]C). Then
it decrypts Elamp001 and acquires its private key.
In the above process, a secure link is established between
the end device and cloud center to transmit the private key
using Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key exchange.
Note that this is only run once in the extract procedure and
is not executed in every run of the AKA procedure. Besides,
due to space limitations we did not involve authentication in
the above process. In real-world applications of smart home,
authentication is easy to establish with the assistance of human
users.
3) Implementation of AKA: The hybrid implementation of
AKA processes of Protocol I and II is as follows:
• Smart edge devices: AKA of Protocol II is deployed on
the edge devices. After extracting the private key from
KGC, two vectors for the private key are generated and
stored securely and separately in the edge device.
• Smart end devices: AKA of Protocol I is deployed on
the end devices. After extract, the private key is stored
securely in the end device.
4) Testing: A prototype is realized and tested on the
platform specified in Table V. The elliptic curve used here
is P-256, the three hash functions are SHA-256, the param-
eter m = 2, the encryption (decryption) algorithm is Rabit
stream cipher in RFC 4503. After setup and extract, the AKA
procedures are executed 10 times between the end and edge
devices. The results are shown in Fig. 7.
We can draw the following conclusions from Fig. 7: 1)
The storage cost on the end device is acceptable. The size
of compiled protocol file is 4045 bytes, and the size of secret
keys file is 231 bytes. Both are much smaller than the storage
of commonly used smart end devices (up to 32 GB or 64 GB).
2) The computing costs are also acceptable for the limited end
device. The computing time of devices registration and private
key extract is only 0.13 seconds on the end device, and that
of AKA is only 0.75 seconds.
IX. CONCLUSION
We have investigated secure and efficient key agreement
for the blockchain-powered intelligent edge. Two ID-based
AKA protocols with eCK security and CAFL-eCK security
respectively have been presented. Compared with existing
key agreement protocols, the proposed protocols are more
convenient and efficient for the blockchain-powered intelligent
edge environment. Besides, Protocol II can resist side-channel
attacks to both KGC and the communicating parties. A use
case which makes use of a hybrid implementation of the
proposed two protocols in blockchain-powered smart home
has been demonstrated. For future work we will consider how
to further improve the storage and computation efficiency of
the leakage resilient ID-based AKA protocols.
APPENDIX
PROOF OF PROTOCOL I
Proof: Firstly, we represent the computation of session
key as follows:
K = H2(A,B,ZA1, ZA2, ZA3, ZA4)
= H2(A,B,ZB1, ZB2, ZB3, ZB4)
= H2(A,B,CDH(PKA, PKB), CDH(TA, PKB),
CDH(PKA, TB), CDH(TA, TB))
= H2(σ1, σ2, σ3, σ4, σ5, σ6)
= H2(σ)
where PKA = [sA]P and PKB = [sB ]P are the long-term
public keys of A and B, and TA = [a]P and TB = [b]P are
the ephemeral public keys of A and B.
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Fig. 5: System overview of the blockchain-powered smart home
Fig. 6: Device registration and private key extract. Note that this process is only executed once and is not executed in AKA
procedures.
To win the eCK security experiment,M should successfully
distinguish the session key K of the test session from a random
string of the same length. There are two ways for the event
M wins happens:
• M correctly guesses the result. The probability is 1/2.
• M queries H2 on the same 6-tuple σ, denoted by event
E.
Therefore,
Pr[M wins] = 1
2
+ Pr[E]
If event E happens, we can construct an ECGDH solver
S against the ECGDH problem in G and using M as a
subroutine. Specifically, S takes an ECGDH challenge V =
[v]P,W = [w]P for some unknown v, p ∈ Zn, plays the eCK
experiment as a challenger withM, and replaces some values
returned by honest parties in a way such that
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(a) Storage costs. (b) Computing costs.
Fig. 7: Costs in the use case
• M cannot detect any modification made by S, and
• when M wins the experiment, S can output the result to
ECGDH(V,W ).
S is constructed as follows in two different cases:
• Case 1: the test session has a matching session
• Case 2: the test session does not have a matching session
In case 1, S randomly chooses a pair of matching sessions
sid and sid∗ involving two parties A and B, and guesses
that one of them is the test session. S make the following
modifications in the experiment:
• If M queried both LongtermKeyReveal(A) and
LongtermKeyReveal(B), S can replace TA with V and
TB with W in the experiment. This wont be found byM
as M cannot query EphemeralKeyReveal(A,B, sid)
and EphemeralKeyReveal(B,A, sid∗) to make sure
the test session is clean. When M wins the experiment,
S can output σ6 as the result to ECGDH(V,W ).
• If M did not query either LongtermKeyReveal(A) or
LongtermKeyReveal(B), S can replaces PKA with
V and PKB with W in the experiment. When M
wins the experiment, S can output σ3 as the result to
ECGDH(V,W ).
• If M queried LongtermKeyReveal(A) and did not
query LongtermKeyReveal(B), S can replaces TA
with V and PKB with W in the experiment. When M
wins the experiment, S can output σ5 as the result to
ECGDH(V,W ).
• If M queried LongtermKeyReveal(B) and did not
query LongtermKeyReveal(A), S can replaces TB
with V and PKA with W in the experiment. When M
wins the experiment, S can output σ4 as the result to
ECGDH(V,W ).
Denote the event that S successfully guessed the test session










In case 2, S randomly chooses a party B and a session
sid where B is the responder, and guesses that sid is the test
session. S make the following modifications in the experiment:
• IfM queried LongtermKeyReveal(A) for the initiator
of sid, S has two choices to modify the experiment and
output the result to ECGDH(V,W ):
– replace TB with V and PKA with W , and output
σ4 when M wins
– replace TA with V and TB with W , and output σ6
when M wins
• If M did not queried LongtermKeyReveal(A), S has
two choices to modify the experiment and output the
result to ECGDH(V,W ):
– replace PKA with V and PKB with W , and output
σ3 when M wins
– replace TA with V and PKB with W , and output
σ5 when M wins
Denote the event that S successfully guessed the party B






Pr[E2] ≤ npns ·AdvECGDHG (S)
In summary,








According to Definition 1,











is negligible since ECGDH is hard in G. Therefore, Protocol
I is eCK secure.
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